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Abstrak 
Sebagai kekuatan ekonomi terbesar kedua setelah Amerika Serikat, Tiongkok telah 
menunjukkan kehebatannya serta peran aktifnya dalam lingkup global. Pandangan elit 
Beijing yang selama ini didominasi oleh kebijakan luar negeri yang bersifat non-intervensi, 
kini telah mengambil jalur yang berbeda. Sebagai negara industri maju, Tiongkok menaruh 
perhatian lebih pada sektor industri. Maka dari itu, energi merupakan salah satu 
kepentingan vital yang harus dicapai dan dijaga Tiongkok. Salah satu negara mitra 
pengekspor minyak ke Tiongkok adalah negara-negara di kawasan Timur Tengah. Berbagai 
kisruh politik dan konflik internal maupun internasional yang terjadi di kawasan tersebut 
seakan menjadi peringatan bagi Tiongkok untuk turut andil demi menjaga kepentingan 
nasionalnya. Relevansi prinsip kebijakan luar negeri non-intervensi Tiongkok ditantang oleh 
berbagai tuntutan dan tekanan internasional. Oleh karena itu, paper ini bertujuan untuk 
meninjau relevansi prinsip kebijakan luar negeri non-intervensi Tiongkok terhadap kawasan 
di Timur Tengah. 
Kata Kunci: China, Middle East, China’s Foreign Policy Principle, Energy, One Belt One Road, 
Trump’s administration. 
 
I. Is China Really Leaving Behind Its Long-Standing Non-Interference 
Foreign Policy in the Middle East? 
China’s staunch neutrality in the Middle East has been its main foreign policy 
principle towards the Arab countries. Dated back to the era of China’s civilization 
5,000 years ago, the era of Confucianism, and the era where external invasion and 
imperial domination prevails.1 The presence and domination of external forces in its 
mainland helped to forge its foreign policy principles, namely mutual respect of 
                                                          
1 Dure Shahwar Bano and Mominyar Khalid, "FROM ISOLATION TO PARTICIPATION: 
ROLE OF CHINA IN THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA," The 
Journal of Political Science 33, (2015): 46, 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/1842431570?accountid=31495. 
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territorial integrity; non-aggression; non-interference in the internal issues of a state; 
equality; and peaceful co-existence.2 China’s excruciating past compelled the 
Chinese to adopt an isolationist foreign policy, favorable for its own nationalism and 
made the Chinese did not like to join the world for quite some time.3 The peaceful 
co-existence principle has been the cornerstone of China’s foreign relations and its 
dealings with other countries. This principle also brought respect for state sovereignty 
as well as territorial integrity, due to China’s long history of external intervention and 
land occupation.  
The peaceful co-existence principle has also forged the China’s staunch 
neutrality in the Middle East, which has prevailed long before 2017. But recent moves 
made by the Chinese government on their foreign relations with the Arab countries 
has raised some eyebrows. China’s foreign policy towards the Middle East can be 
seen by several foreign policy decisions in the era of President Xi Jinping and Premier 
of the State Council, Li Keqiang, further indicating the new grand strategy for the 
Middle East. The highlight of China’s new grand strategy for the Middle East is that 
it’s moving closer towards the region.4 One of them can be seen by several visits by 
President Xi Jinping to the Middle East, included Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United 
Arab Emirates, all the majority Sunni countries.5 During his Middle East trip, the 
president also stopped in Tehran to sign 17 economic and technological agreements, 
becoming the first foreign leader to visit Iran since the sanctions against it been lifted.6  
China even got itself involved into the Syrian crisis, by inviting both Syrian 
Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem and the head of the opposition group, the Syrian 
                                                          
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid, 47. 
4 Gal Luft, “China’s New Grand Strategy for the Middle East,” Foreign Policy, last updated 
on January 26, 2016, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/26/chinas-new-middle-east-
grand-strategy-iran-saudi-arabia-oil-xi-jinping/. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Cindy, “China’s New Grand Strategy for the Middle East,” China Digital Times, last 
updated on January 27, 2016, http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2016/01/chinas-new-grand-
strategy-for-the-middle-east/. 
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National Coalition (SNC), to high-level meeings in Beijing as an effort to promote 
peaceful resolutios.7 If inviting the parties involved in the Syrian crisis is not enough, 
China was sending Xie Xiaoyan, a career diplomat and a former ambassador to Iran, 
as a special envoy for the Syrian crisis in order to push peace talks and peaceful 
resolution.8 Aside from efforts made by the Chinese to generate peace talk and 
resolution in the Middle East growing conflicts, China also has its own problems with 
the Muslim-majority territory in northwest China, Xinjiang. In a recent event in 2016, 
China received criticism due to its ‘repressive’ treatment of the Uyghur Muslims in 
Xinjiang.9 In order to promote a more positive image of China to the Arab countries, 
China’s leaders are pouring a large amount of approximately $3.5 billion to transform 
Yinchuan – a home to the Hui Muslim (Chinese-speaking Muslims and ethnically 
Chinese) – into a “World Muslim City” and build a mosque resembling “Golden 
Palace” in the Arabic literature.10 This investment was done due to diplomatic 
strategy of creating closer ties with the Middle East by emphasizing common ground 
in history and culture, shared by the Sino-Arab.11 President Xi Jinping further 
published a white paper contemplating his plans to gain more influence in the Middle 
East.  
The question is clear, whether or not China is leaving behind its long-standing 
non-interference foreign policy in the Middle East. But, the answer is still vague. So 
is the Arab policy paper made by China. Thus, this paper is trying to answer the 
questions put forward by examining the factors that might indicate China’s departure 
from its long-standing foreign policy in the Middle East. The first part of the paper is 
                                                          
7 Luft, “China’s New Grand Strategy.”  
8 Niu Song, “Neutrality gives China edge in the Middle East,” Global Times, last updated on 
April 11, 2016, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/978083.shtml.  
9 Elizabeth Winkler, “China is building a Muslim Theme Park to promote its state-
sanctioned version of Islam,” Quartz, last updated on May 13, 2016, 
https://qz.com/683589/china-is-building-a-muslim-theme-park-to-promote-its-state-
sanctioned-version-of-islam/. 
10 Ibid.  
11 Ibid.  
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presenting the facts of China’s departure in its non-interference foreign policy in the 
Middle East; the second part of the paper is presenting the neorealist perspectives as 
the main notion in the analysis; the third part of the paper is going to examine the 
factors influencing the China’s shift in foreign policy towards the Middle East, 
presented by three driving forces, mainly the energy, the ISIS factor, and the U.S. 
vacuum in the Middle East; while the last part of the paper will wrap up the whole 
discussion.  
II. How the Classical Realist views China’s New Grand Strategy for the 
Middle East 
One of the Classical Realist thinker, Niccolo Machiavelli, emphasized the 
values of security and survival of the state as main forces in guiding the state’s foreign 
policy. The leaders of a country must take its responsibility in protecting their country 
and its citizens. In doing so, Machiavelli envision that a leader must be as strong as 
the lion, and deceptive as the fox. Power and deception are two essential means for 
the conduct of foreign policy. The main responsibility of rulers is to seek advantages 
and to defend state’s interests as well as to ensure its survival. Classical realist 
perceives the world as an anarchical and dangerous world, but also an opportune one. 
To survive, rulers must always be aware of any dangers and take any necessary 
precautions against them. And to prosper, rulers must recognize and exploit the 
opportunities presented to them. Those survival and prosperity rules are suggesting 
that the conduct of foreign policy is an instrumental activity of a country. In addition 
to that, Machiavelli stressed that rulers have to be both powerful and deceptive in the 
conduct of their foreign policy, since their people depend upon them for their survival 
and prosperity.12  
                                                          
12 Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, Introduction to International Relations: Theories 
and Approaches, fifth edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 69-70. 
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China’s shift in its foreign policy in the Middle East is acceptable according to 
the Classical Realist, since this world is a dangerous and opportune place. Just like 
the Middle East, a tumultuous region, but also full of opportunities. China, being an 
emerging global player has the responsibility to show its active role in the global 
sphere. In doing so, it’s not merely for the sake of its global image, but also to 
maintain its national interest, since closer ties with the region means a more active 
role in helping to resolve foreign affairs in the conflicting region. The Middle East, a 
dangerous place that could threaten many of China’s growing national interests in the 
region, not only national interest, but also its national security. Despite its conflicting 
nature, the Middle East is also an opportune place for the Chinese to show its role as 
the global power in the region as well as in achieving China’s interest, mainly the 
“One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) policy, and if it succeed in grabbing the opportunities, 
the Classical Realist thinks that the opportunity could bring great advantages to 
China. The next parts will elaborate the factors China’s facing that might change its 
staunch of neutrality in the Middle East.  
III. China’s Thirst for Energy and the ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiative 
In history, China has been known as a great player in the economic sphere and 
the king of the industry. Industry itself has been one of the driving forces to the 
economy of China.13 Industry means energy. And to fuel up its economy, China needs 
a lot of it. In order to satisfy its thirst for energy, China travels all the way to the Arab 
countries, the hydrocarbon-rich lands. China’s energy import from the Middle East 
constitutes mostly by crude oil. To satisfy the ever-increasing demand for industrial 
needs at home, China has quickly surpassed the U.S. as the world’s largest oil 
importer, where 50 percent of its oil imports come from the Middle East.14 The crude 
                                                          
13 Zuliu Hu and Mohsin S. Khan, “Why Is China Growing So Fast?” Economic Issues, no. 8, 
(1997): 9, https://www.imf.org/EXTERNAL/PUBS/FT/ISSUES8/issue8.pdf. 
14 Keith Johnson, “China Tops U.S. As Biggest Oil Importer,” Foreign Policy, last updated 
on May 11, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/11/china-tops-u-s-as-biggest-oil-
importer-middle-east-opec-sloc/. 
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oil comes mainly from Saudi Arabia, accounted for 16% of China’s net oil import, 
about one million barrel per day, followed by Oman (10%), Iraq (9%), Iran (9%), 
United Arab Emirates (4%), and Kuwait (3%), leaving behind another forty nine 
percent to other regions.15  
Despite its oil-rich land, the Middle East has also been one of the most 
tumultuous regions in the world. And the term ‘conflict’ seems like an 
interchangeable term for the region. Long history has never made peace with the 
region, and the region may shortly be described as a region that’s busy with smokes 
and guns. While China, the second largest economy in the world, is always busy with 
its economic and industrial plan, in search of energy. Once a net oil exporter, China 
is now a net oil importer, raising new concern for the energy security planners in 
China.16 Growing reliance of China’s oil needs to the region has left loopholes in 
China’s energy security. Having a history of using oil as a foreign policy tool has 
made China to be aware that growing dependence on foreign oil can badly influence 
one’s national interest.17 In order to accommodate its reliance on foreign oil to sustain 
its economy, China invested much of its money abroad for energy projects to more 
than 50 countries.18 Due to its supersize economy, one of the main forces in 
determining China’s foreign policy is its economy. In order to sustain the economy 
owing to massive industrial growth and production, China needs to secure its energy 
needs. The needs were manifested into the OBOR policy initiated by President Xi 
Jinping in 2013. 
                                                          
15 Statista, “Breakdown of China’s crude oil imports in 2014, by source country,” last 
updated on 2014, https://www.statista.com/statistics/221765/chenese-oil-imports-by-
country/. 
16 Erica Strecker Downs, China’s Quest for Energy Security (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corportation, 2000), 12.  
17 Ibid, 44. 
18 Tyler Durden, “Where Does China Import Its Energy from (And What This Means for the 
Petroyuan),” ZeroHedge, last updated on January 20, 2014, 
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-01-20/where-does-china-import-its-energy-and-
what-means-petroyuan. 
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Since President Xi Jinping’s rise to power, he has been making the Chinese 
foreign policy stance on various issues clear and expressed his desire of revitalizing 
the nation, called the “China Dream”.19 The “China Dream” has since become the 
important starting point in creating the OBOR policy, focusing on securing China’s 
trade and energy routes.20 The OBOR policy serves as a foreign policy and economic 
strategy for China and is created to link the Europe to China as well as the Africa and 
Oceania economically through countries across Eurasia and the Indian Ocean.21 The 
initiative encompasses five key areas of cooperation, namely coordinating 
development policies; forging infrastructure and facilities networks; strengthening 
investment and trade relations; enhancing financial cooperation; and deepening social 
and cultural exchanges.22 Highly ambitious OBOR wishes to link and connect ‘all 
roads to Beijing’ and in order to secure its energy routes along the way from the 
Middle East, OBOR serves as its ground point to sustain China’s economy.  
In order to carry forward the OBOR initiative, it is hardly possible to stick with 
its long-standing non-interference foreign policy principle in the tumultuous region. 
Energy is one of the most important things that drive the Chinese economy. Its 
growing dependence on foreign oil could be a dangerous thing, knowing that the oil 
mainly comes from the most riotous region in the world. Thus, securing its energy 
routes is crucial prerequisite to make ends meet for the Chinese. And the interest has 
been manifested into the OBOR initiative. There is a lot to do in implementing the 
OBOR initiative, one of them leaving no spot for China’s foreign policy principle of 
non-interference. Moderating its non-interference stance and taking more proactive 
                                                          
19 Umbreen Javaid and Meer Waheed, “China's Foreign Policy in the Middle East,” South 
Asian Studies 31, no. 2 (Jul, 2016): 324, 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/1864148277?accountid=31495. 
20 Ibid.  
21 Geoff Wade, “China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiative,” Parliament of Australia, accessed 
on April 10, 2017, 
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Librar
y/pubs/BriefingBook45p/ChinasRoad. 
22 Ibid.  
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stance in the region’s affairs are important in implementing the OBOR as well as 
maintaining its economic and political interest in the region.23 
IV. The ISIS Factor 
Syrian crisis, involving not only global powers but also non-state actors, 
mainly the ISIS. An armed terrorist group that’s not only causing menace in the 
region, but throughout other part of the world as well. China is no exception. Xinjiang 
is the region in China in which majority of Uyghur (Turkic speaking) Muslims live 
in China. Apparently, threats from the ISIS are getting closer to Beijing through the 
Uyghur community in Xinjiang. China is concerned with the increasing number of 
militants of Chinese Uyghurs who have joined the ISIS and bringing the serious 
threats home, risking its national security.24 Playing more active role in the crisis 
would prevent the spillover to reach China. And if China doesn’t take any role in the 
crisis, it cannot prove itself as a responsible global player. Injecting itself into the 
conflict may prove its power to the Arab countries by reflecting China’s positive 
international and regional image as well as achieving its political and economic 
interest.25 
The ISIS also imposes threats to China’s economic interest (energy) and further 
the implementation of the OBOR. In ensuring the success of the OBOR, it is essential 
to maintain a stable and peaceful region, since the region lies within the OBOR’s 
strategic planned routes. China’s envoy for the Syrian crisis, Xie Xiaoyan, stated that 
“China is ready to work with other major powers, including Russia, in post-war 
reconstruction efforts in Syria.”26 Thus, eliminating the ISIS factor, is not only 
                                                          
23 Mordechai Chaziza, "SYRIA'S CIVIL WAR: STAGE FOR GREATER CHINESE 
INVOLVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST?" Middle East Review of International Affairs 
(Online) 20, no. 2 (Summer, 2016): 3, 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/1835983416?accountid=31495.  
24 Chaziza, “Syria’s Civil War,” 2-3. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Romanjuk, “China’s ‘Arab Pivot’.” 
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important for the energy and the OBOR, but also to maintain China’s own national 
security. And in doing so, China is offering military training and humanitarian 
supplies in Syria, as well as having a new anti-terrorism law, giving China more space 
to conduct counterterrorism mission overseas.27 In 2016, China’s military officials 
coordinated a cooperation and military assistance, together with Russia and Syria’s 
military officials.28 This cooperation is indicating China’s increased awareness for 
more military presence in the region. 
V. U.S. Absence in the Middle East 
Another external factor that drives the Chinese to call it quit on its staunch 
neutrality in the Middle East, is the rarely-seen U.S. absence in the Middle East. This 
event is mainly a ‘bonus’ and opportunity for the Chinese. During the second Obama 
administration, the world has seen the decreasing involvement of the U.S. in the 
Middle East, mainly prior to its two unsuccessful wars in the region, signaling its 
limited power in the region, and also due to its decreasing dependency on energy from 
the Middle East, thanks to its fracking technology.29 Under Obama, the U.S. has made 
limited and unsuccessful effort in its campaign against ISIS. After the Obama 
administration, the Trump administration resumes the power in 2017. One of the first 
moves that Trump made is the cuts in foreign military spending, mainly the foreign 
aid.30 The money will overflow in bigger amount to the Pentagon, but not for foreign 
use, rather for the U.S. domestic defense, such as buying warships and warplanes, 
increasing the number of American ground troops and modernizing the nuclear 
                                                          
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid.  
29 Efraim Inbar, “Consequences of American Retreat from the Middle East,” Middle East 
Issues: AS U.S. Regional Influence Wanes, Russia, Iran, & China Exploit the Vacuum, Vol. 
XI, no. 3.748, (2016): 1, http://www.isranet.org/middle-east-issues-us-regional-influence-
wanes-russia-iran-china-exploit-vacuum. 
30 Helene Cooper and Peter Baker, “Critics Assail Cuts in Foreign Spending as Trump 
Moves to Boost Military Spending,” The New York Times, last updated on February 27, 
2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/27/us/politics/trump-foreign-military-spending-
cuts-criticism.html?_r=0. 
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arsenal.31 Limited U.S. presence in the Syrian crisis couldn’t bring the conflict to an 
end. The Beijing policy makers are beginning to fear the possibility of spill-over in 
the Syrian crisis and destabilize the whole region, giving negative impacts to China’s 
trade in the region, especially crude oil, recalling half of its oil imports come from 
the region.32 
The lessening U.S. presence in the region means vacuum of global dominant 
power in the region, and also means more place for the Chinese. It’s not just a mere 
idle talk, since China has long been making moves towards the Middle East. One 
quick instance is when the 9/11 stroke the U.S. hard and creating a negative sentiment 
of its people towards the Muslim people. Soon, Islamophobia has become ubiquitous 
in the U.S. and discrimination of Muslims in the U.S. takes place, thus decreasing its 
relations with the Arab countries. China, on the other hand, being an opportunist, has 
quickly grabbed the opportunity the U.S. has left behind, by establishing the Chinese-
Arab Friendship Association (CAFA) to promote bilateral relations with the Arab 
countries.33 One of the organizer at the China-Arab States Economic and Trade 
Forum stated that, “The kind of discrimination Muslims faced in the West after 9/11 
will have no place in Chinese-Arab relations,”34 emphasizing China’s growing 
interest in the Arab countries. The 2001 event is the reminder that the Chinese has 
not only been watching and learning a lot from the U.S., but also managed to grab 
many of the U.S.’ lost business opportunities. When Islamophobia prevails in the 
West, especially the U.S., China is busy building closer ties with the Arab countries, 
building more mosque in China, constructing Muslim theme park, and making several 
trips to the Arab countries, bringing back dozens of favorable deals home. The 
Chinese is also filling the vacuum left by the U.S. in several conflict resolution and 
                                                          
31 Ibid.  
32 Chaziza, “Syria’s Civil War,” 3.  
33 Massoud Hayoun, "China's Approach to the Middle East Looks Familiar," The Diplomat, 
last updated on November 29, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/11/chinas-approach-to-
the-middle-east-looks-familiar/. 
34 Ibid.  
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management in the region, such as one in the Syria. China has been making efforts in 
order to facilitate peace talks between conflicting parties in the Syrian crisis, due to 
the U.S. limited presence in its campaign against ISIS. Though the Chinese still 
clearly stated that it is against any intervention in Syria, its economic interest in the 
region may dictate its foreign policy to intervene in the Syrian crisis.  
In addition to that, recent travel ban to the six Muslim-majority countries, 
namely Iran, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, Syria and Libya35 is still in the process and 
culminating controversies. While the U.S. is busy with its still-in-the-working travel 
ban and busy cutting its budget on pretty much everything that has to do with foreign 
military operations, China is busy offering its Infrastructure-as-Energy deals and 
implementing its huge ambition of the OBOR policy by investing in building 
highways, railways, and other infrastructure required for the implementation of the 
OBOR. Aside from that, China’s close relation with both Shiite and Sunni state in the 
region will come at the expense of relations with others.36 During 2014-2016 alone, 
China became actively involved in the region’s affairs, such as willingly become the 
mediator for certain conflicts in the region, but that initiative came solely to ensure 
the energy security and the implementation of the OBOR.  
VI. Conclusion  
After thorough elaboration of the factors that made the Chinese to change its 
staunch of neutrality in the conduct of its foreign policy in the Middle East, it is fair 
to conclude that China has a lot of reasons that force it to shift from its staunch of 
neutrality in the Middle East. Being an opportunist, China’s clever to maneuver with 
                                                          
35 Sabrina Siddiqui, Lauren Gambino, and Oliver Laughland, “Trump travel ban: new order 
targeting six Muslim-majority countries signed,” The Guardian, last updated on March 6, 
2017, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/mar/06/new-trump-travel-ban-muslim-
majority-countries-refugees. 
36 Scott N. Romanjuk and Tobias J. Burgers, “China’s ‘Arab Pivot’ Signals the End of Non-
Intervention,” The Diplomat, last updated on December 20, 2016, 
http://thediplomat.com/2016/12/chinas-arab-pivot-signals-the-end-of-non-intervention/. 
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its non-interference foreign policy principle in the Middle East, but recalling that half 
of its oil imports come from the region, China has to rethink its staunch of neutrality 
in the region due to its close ties with both the Shiite and Sunni in the Arab countries. 
Meanwhile its close ties with the Arab countries is due to its oil demands at home. In 
securing the energy from the region, China is implementing a highly ambitious 
OBOR policy. In implementing the policy, it is hardly possible if the China to keep 
its staunch of neutrality in the region. If the OBOR wishes to succeed, a greater role 
of China in the region is expected, just like it already did in the region, taking more 
active role in the region, by giving humanitarian supplies and military training to the 
region, as well as joining the Russian allies in the conflict in 2016. Apparently, China 
has been busy maintaining its national security as well as prosperity as the 
consequences of being the new global power. Furthermore, the U.S. rare presence in 
the region, since the Obama administration has given the Chinese more space to get 
more opportunities the U.S. has left. U.S. recent sentiment on the Muslims due to its 
travel ban has very much benefitted the Chinese in aligning closer to the region. 
Recent events presented in previous parts show that China is both a strong and 
deceptive force in conducting its foreign policy in the region, and its long-standing 
non-interference foreign policy principle is facing a great challenge, due to the 
changing nature of China’s role in the world politics, although Beijing hasn’t clearly 
stated that it is leaving the principle behind, their actions and the OBOR foreign 
policy is telling other story. And in the process of implementing it, the OBOR policy 
hampers the relevance of China’s long-standing non-interference foreign policy 
principle, for it to succeed, and it works the other way around.  
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